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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals is conferred with jurisdiction over
the instant appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES / STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court erred in determining that the

totality of the facts and circumstances

of the stop did not

constitute a seizure that requires reasonable suspicion.

The

appellate court reviews the factual findings underlying the denial
of a motion to suppress using a clearly erroneous standard and the
conclusions of law based on those facts for correction of error.
See

State

v. Brown,

853

P.3d

851, 854-55

clarified by the Utah Supreme Court in State

(Utah

v. Brake,

103 P. 3d 699, the reviewing court is to apply a

1992).

As

2004 UT 95,

xx

non-def erential

review" to the "application of the law to the underlying factual
findings in search and seizure cases."

Preservation

of Issue Citation

Id.

or Statement

at 1fl5, 103 P. 3d 699.

of Grounds for Review:

Appointed trial counsel, among other citations set forth in the
record on appeal, preserved this issue by way of the Motion to
Suppress & Memorandum and arguments set forth in the record at R.

20-29 and in passim,

et

seq.

1

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
U.S. Const. amend. VI
The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules,
regulations, or case law whose interpretation is determinative,
are set out verbatim, with the appropriate citation, in the body
and arguments of the instant Brief of Appellant.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves critical questions involving the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution arising out of the
seizure and subsequent search of Ms. Hughes' person.

Ms. Hughes

was charged with Possession or Use of a Controlled Substance, a
third-degree

felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-

8(2) (a) (i) , and Possession of Less than 1 ounce of Marijuana, a
class B misdemeanor,

in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-

8(2) (d) .
After appearing for a preliminary hearing and being bound
over, Ms. Hughes pleaded not guilty to the charges.

On July 11,

2006, the Court held an evidentiary hearing on the search.

Ms.

Hughes, through appointed trial counsel, thereafter filed a Motion
to

Suppress

the

evidence.

The

State

responded

by

filing

Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Suppress.
trial court denied the Motion.

2

a

The

Ms. Hughes subsequently appeared for a jury trial on the
charges.

At trial, appointed trial counsel renewed the Motion to

Suppress, which the trial court again denied.

At the conclusion

of trial, the jury convicted Ms. Hughes on both counts.
Based on the convictions, the trial court

sentenced Ms.

Hughes to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the
Utah State Prison and 180 days, respectively, which the court
suspended.

The court then sentenced Ms. Hughes to 3 0 days home

confinement, which was entered on March 16, 2007.

On April 4,

2007, Ms. Hughes, through appointed appellate counsel, filed a
timely Notice of Appeal.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts are recited in detail "because the legal analysis
in a search and seizure case is highly fact dependent."
Warren,

2003 UT 36, \2,

State

78 P.3d 590 (citing State v. Hansen,

v.
2002

UT 125, 1(5, 63 P.3d 650) .
1.

While on patrol at approximately 1:00 a.m., on April 9,

2006, Deputy Davis County Sheriff Arnold Butcher1 observed three

*At the time, Deputy Butcher was working in the Paramedics Patrol
Division (R. 172:68:11-13) .
3

individuals2 walking in an intersection in Layton, Utah, appearing
to exchange "something hand-to-hand"
2.

(R. 171:12-24). 3

Deputy Butcher pulled his patrol car to the side of the

road near to where the three individuals stood, stepped out of his
car, and ordered Ms. Hughes and her two male companions to come
back, asking them, " [W]hat
171:8:8-9).

They

[i]s going on"?

responded

that

(R. 171:26:1-3; R.

they were walking

home

(R.

171:8:13-14).
3.

Deputy Butcher asked each of them for their age and

identification because they "appeared somewhat young" to him (R.
171:26:16-23).
4.

Each of them provided their age but they did not have

any identification (R. 171:26:20-25).

As a result, they provided

their names and dates of birth (Id.) .
5.

After

obtaining

their

personal

information,

Deputy

Butcher did not "run that information right away"4 but instead
inquired whether they had any weapons without observing anything

2

Deputy Butcher initially observed the three individuals
"probably 500 to 700 feet away" while traveling in his patrol
vehicle" (R. 171:33-34) .
"^According to Deputy Butcher, he first observed the three
individuals crossing the street where pedestrians would be expected
to cross inasmuch as there was no stoplight or crosswalk at the
intersection (R. 171:13:4-11).
4

In fact, "several minutes" passed before Deputy Butcher ran the
records check (R. 171:15-16).
4

that caused him to believe there were any weapons on them (R.
171:27:8; R. 171 : 38:12-22) .5
6.

Deputy Butcher was told no (R. 171:27:8-10).

He then

asked if he could check them for weapons, to which he was told "it
was okay go ahead" (R. 171:27:14).6
7.

After a pat down check of one of the male suspects,

Deputy Butcher located a knife (R. 171:27:16-23).

In the course

of the pat down check, Deputy Butcher also located some finger
scales and what appeared to be marijuana (R. 171:28-29).
8.

Deputy Butcher placed the male suspect in custody and

called for backup (R. 171: 29:3-4) .7
9.

Deputy

Clay

Hawkins

responded

in

a

second

patrol

vehicle, approached Ms. Hughes, and asked her if she had any
weapons (R. 171:41:4-6).
10.

Ms. Hughes responded by informing Deputy Hawkins that

she had already surrendered the mini wooden bat (R. 171:41:8-9).

Deputy Butcher confirmed later that Ms. Hughes was 26 years old,
and that the two other individuals were ages 24 and 22 (R. 171:38:311) •
6

Ms. Hughes, upon Deputy Butcher's request, responded by
retrieving u a small little wooden mini bat" from her coat sleeve (R.
171:29:13-24) .
7

All three of the individuals were in front of Deputy Butcher's
patrol vehicle when he called for backup (R. 171:15:10-14). Deputy
Butcher utilized his hand held radio to call for backup (R.
171:15:18-19) .
5

11.

Deputy Hawkins then said that he was going to pat her

down for weapons, to which she said "no" (R. 171:41:11-12).
then told her that

He

"it wasn't going to be that thorough of a

search" (R. 171:41:13-14).
12.
some

In the course of that search, Deputy Hawkins located

marijuana

in

the

coat

pocket

worn

by

Ms.

Hughes

(R.

171:41:16-25).
13.

Ms. Hughes was then arrested for the marijuana located

on her person (R. 171:30:3-7).
14.

Based on a subsequent records check to verify their

names, Deputy Butcher found an outstanding warrant for Ms. Hughes
(R. 171:30:12-16).

Ms. Hughes was also purportedly arrested for

that warrant (R. 171:30:8-19).
15.

Ms. Hughes was charged with Possession or Use of a

Controlled Substance, a third-degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), and Possession of Less than 1 ounce
of Marijuana, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(d)

See

(R. 1-2).

R. 1-2, Information, a true

and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum A.
16.

After a preliminary hearing and being bound over, Ms.

Hughes pleaded not guilty to the charges (R. 19).
17.

On July 11, 2006, the Court held an evidentiary hearing

on the search (R. 18-19).
6

18.

Thereafter, Ms. Hughes, through appointed trial counsel,

filed a Motion to Suppress the evidence (R. 20-29).

See R. 20-29,

Motion to Suppress and supporting Memorandum, a true and correct
copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum B.
19.

The State responded by filing a Memorandum in Opposition

to Defendant's Motion to Suppress

(R. 30-36).

See R. 30-36,

Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Suppress, a true
and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum C.
20.

The trial court denied the Motion, concluding that the

"request for identification alone as a matter of law does not
constitute a show of authority sufficient to convert an innocent
encounter into a seizure."

(R. 171:58-59).

The court further

concluded that the encounter "never got beyond level 1", and that
the search "was pursuant to consent"

(R. 171:59:3-5).

See R.

171:57-61, Transcript of trial court's ruling on the Motion to
Suppress, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as
Addendum D.
21.

Ms. Hughes subsequently appeared for a jury trial on the

charges (R. 65-66) .
22.

During the course of that trial, appointed trial counsel

renewed the Motion to Suppress, which the trial court again denied
(R. 172:123:15-20) .

7

23.

At

the conclusion of trial, the jury convicted Ms.

Hughes on both counts (R. 118).
24.

Based on the convictions, the trial court sentenced Ms.

Hughes to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the
Utah State Prison and 180 days, respectively, which the court
suspended
days

home

(R. 131).

The court then sentenced Ms. Hughes to 30

confinement

(R.

132).

See R.

131-134, Sentence,

Judgment, Commitment, a true and correct copy of which is attached
hereto as Addendum E.
25.

On

April

4,

2 0 07,

Ms.

Hughes,

through

appointed

appellate counsel, filed a timely Notice of Appeal (R. 140-43).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

The trial court erred in determining that the totality

of the facts and circumstances of the stop did not constitute a
seizure that requires reasonable suspicion.

Deputy Butcher's

initial request for identification alone did not constitute a
level two stop.

Nevertheless, any level one encounter escalated

to a level two stop during Deputy Butcher's investigation.
Taking the totality of the circumstances into consideration,
a reasonable person in Ms. Hughes' position would not feel free to
just walk away by abandoning her property, let alone approaching
Deputy Butcher to take back her property and leave.

8

Rather,

Deputy Butcher's accusatory tone of voice and language, retention
of

property,

pat

down,

and

custody

of

her

male

companion

sufficiently restrained Mr. Hughes' freedom to the point that she
was seized for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.
In light of the facts known to Deputies Butcher and Hawkins
at the time of the seizure, there was no reasonable articulable
suspicion supporting the seizure of Ms. Hughes.

The facts known

to the Deputies were, at the very least, as consistent with lawful
behavior

as with

the

commission

of

a

crime.

In

testimony of both the Deputies confirms as much.

fact,

the

Hence, there

exists no basis upon which to justify the level two stop and
seizure of Ms. Hughes, which violated her rights under the Fourth
Amendment.

ARGUMENTS
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE
TOTALITY OF THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE
STOP DID NOT CONSTITUTE A SEIZURE THAT REQUIRES
REASONABLE SUSPICION,
A.

The Fundamental Right to be Free
Unreasonable Searches and Seizures.

From

Individuals under both the Fourth Amendment to the United
States

Constitution

and

the

Utah

Constitution

are

protected from "unreasonable searches and seizures/'

9

expressly

U.S. Const.

amend. IV;8 Utah Const, art. I, § 14;
851, 855 (Utah 1992) (citing Katz
353, 88 S.Ct. 507 (1967)).

State

v. United

v. Brown,
States,

853 P.2d

389 U.S. 347,

The right to be free from unreasonable

searches and seizures embodied in both the United States and Utah
Constitutions is one of the most fundamental and cherished rights.
See, e.g.,

Winston

v. Lee,

470 U.S. 753, 758, 105 S.Ct. 1611

(1985) ("The Fourth Amendment protects . . . 'the right to be let
alone

-- the most comprehensive of rights and the right most

valued by civilized men.'")
277

U.S.

438,

478,

dissenting)); Camara
S.Ct.

1727

(1967)

48

(quoting Olmstead
S.Ct.

v. Municipal
("The

564

v. United

(1928)

Court,

States,

(Brandeis,

J.,

387 U.S. 523, 528, 87

Fourth Amendment

thus gives

concrete

expression to a right of the people which is 'basic to a free
society.'") (quoting Wolf

v. Colorado,

338 U.S. 25, 27, 69 S.Ct.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const, amend IV.
9

The Utah Constitution provides the following:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall
issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the person or thing to be seized.
Utah Const, art. I, § 14.
10

1359 (1949), overruled

by,

(1961))); Harris

1684

Mapp v.

v. United

Ohio,

States,

367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct.
331 U.S. 145, 150, 67

S.Ct. 1098 (1947) ("This Court has consistently asserted that the
rights of privacy and personal security protected by the Fourth
Amendment; . . . are to be regarded as of the very essence of
constitutional

liberty;

and

that

the guaranty

of

them

is as

important and as imperative as are the guaranties of the other
fundamental rights of the individual citizen. . . .'") (quoting
Gouled

v. United

overruled
294,

States,

in part

87 S.Ct.

California,

by,
1642

255 U.S. 298, 304, 41 S.Ct. 261 (1921),

Warden,

Md. Penitentiary

(1967))),

overruled

in

v.

Hayden,

part

by,

387 U.S.
Chimel

v.

395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034 (1969).
B.

The
Reasonableness-in-all-the-Circumstances
Analysis Under the Fourth Amendment.

The guiding

"touchstone" of an analysis under the Fourth

Amendment "is always the reasonableness in all the circumstances
of the particular invasion of a citizen's personal security."
United

States

v.

Holt,

264 F.3d 1215, 1220,

(10th Cir. 2001).

Reasonableness accordingly depends on a balancing of the public
interest and the individual's right to personal security free from
arbitrary
Mimms,
also

interference

by law officers.

See Pennsylvania

434 U.S. 106, 108-09, 98 S.Ct. 330 (1977) (per curiam);

Illinois

v.

McArthur,

v.
see

531 U.S. 326, 330, 121 S.Ct. 946, 950

11

(2001) (stating that the Court "balance[s] the privacy-related and
law enforcement-related concerns to determine if the intrusion was
reasonable."); New York
(1986)

(balancing

v. Class,

"the

475 U.S. 106, 116, 106 S.Ct. 960

need

to

search

or

seize

against

invasion whi_ch the search or seizure entails") (quoting Terry
Ohio,

392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968)).

disfavor
relying
Robinette,

biight-line
instead

on

rules
the

in

basic

the

Fourth

balancing

the
v.

Generally, courts
Amendment

test.

519 U.S. 33, 39, 117 S.Ct. 417 (1996) .

See

context,
Ohio

v.

Hence, no one

factor is determinative in performing such an analysis, rather
reasonableness is "measured m

objective terms by examining the

totality of the circumstances."
C,

Jd., 117 S.Ct. 417.

The Circumstances Surrounding the Stop by
Deputies Butcher and Hawkins Demonstrated a
Show of Authority Sufficient to Convert the
Stop from a Level One to a Level Two
Encounter.

The Fourth Amendment provides the following three different
levels of police-citizen encounters:
(1) An officer may approach a citizen at any time
and pose questions so long as the citizen is not
detained against his will; (2) an officer may
seize a person if the officer has an articulable
suspicion that the person has committed or is
about to commit a crime . . .; (3) an officer may
arrest a suspect if the officer has probable cause
tc believe an offense had been committed or is
being committed.

12

State v. Markland,
State

v.

2005 UT 26, 1fl0 n.l, 112 P.3d 507

Johnson,

805

P.2d

761, 763 (Utah 1991)).

(quoting

A level

one

encounter " x is a voluntary encounter where a citizen may respond
to an officer's inquiries but is free to leave at any time.'"
Salt

Lake

City

v. Ray,

State v. Jackson,
v. Bean,

2000 UT App 55, ^fll, 998 P.2d 274 (citing

805 P. 2d 765, 767 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) and State

869 P.2d 984, 986 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)).

"As long as a

person 'remains free to disregard the questions and walk away,
there has been no intrusion upon that person's liberty or privacy
as would under the Constitution require some particularized and
objective justification.'"

Jackson,

United

446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870,

States

v. Mendenhall,

805 P. 2d at 767

(quoting

1877 (1980) ) .
In contrast, under a level two stop, the person is seized for
purposes of the Fourth Amendment "when the officer " x by means of
physical force or show of authority has in some way restrained the
liberty'" of a person.

Bean,

869 P.2d at 986 (quoting

446 U.S. at 552, 100 S. Ct. at 1876 (quoting Terry
U.S. 1, 19 n.16, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879 n.16 (1968)).

Mendenhall,

v. Ohio,

392

Consequently,

a level one encounter becomes a level two stop and "a seizure
under the fourth amendment occurs when a reasonable person, in
view of all the circumstances, would believe he or she is not free
to leave."

Jackson,

805 P.2d at 767.

13

This occurs "even if the

purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention brief."
State

v. Steward,

806 P.2d 213, 216 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); see

State

v.

754 P.2d 972, 975 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (citing

Sierra,

Delaware

v.

(1979)).

Prouse,

440 U.S.

648, 653,

99

S. Ct.

also

1391, 1395

Some examples of circumstances indicating a seizure,

even where the person did not attempt to leave include " x the
threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon
by

an officer,

some physical

touching

of

the

person

of

the

citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that
compliance with the officer's request might be compelled.'"
v. Patefield,
Mendenhall,

927 P. 2d 655, 659

(Utah Ct. App. 1996)

(quoting

446 U.S. at 554, 100 S.Ct. At 1877).

GeneraLly

speaking, Deputy Butcher's

initial

request

identification alone did not constitute a level two stop.
Deitman,
United

State

739 P. 2d at 618; accord
States

v. Castellanos,

Jackson,

731 F.2d 979, 983 (D.C. Cir. 1984));

869 P.2d at 987; see also

Florida

501,

103

(plurality

permissibility

1319
of

(1983)

officer

See

805 P. 2d at 768 (quoting

Bean,

S.Ct.

for

simply

suspect's ticket and driver license).

v. Royer,

asking

460 U.S. 491,

opinion)
for

and

(affirming
examining

Nevertheless, any level one

encounter escalated to a level two stop during Deputy Butcher's
investigation.
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Initially confronting Ms. Hughes and her two male companions
by pulling his patrol vehicle near to where they stood on the side
of the road, Deputy Butcher stepped out of his car and ordered
them to come back, asking them,
Butcher

asked each of

them

u

[W]hat [i]s going on"?

for their age

and

because they ''appeared somewhat young" to him.

Deputy

identification
They provided

their names and dates of birth inasmuch as they did not have any
identification.

At that point, Deputy Butcher did not run a

records check of the personal information but rather straightway
inquired whether they had any weapons without observing anything
that caused him to believe there were any weapons on them.10

Ms.

Hughes, upon Deputy Butcher's request, responded by retrieving "a
small

little wooden mini bat" from her coat

sleeve.

Deputy

Butcher then began checking for weapons by performing a pat down
check of one of Ms. Hughes' male companions, during which he
located a knife.

During that pat down check, Deputy Butcher also

located some finger scales and what appeared to be marijuana.
Deputy Butcher then took the male companion into custody and
called for backup.

When the second uniformed deputy responded in

another patrol vehicle, he approached Ms. Hughes and immediately
asked

her

if she had any weapons.

Ms. Hughes

responded

by

Deputy Butcher waited "several minutes" before running the
records check (R. 171:15-16).
15

informing hum that she had previously surrendered the mini wooden
bat to Deputy Butcher.

Nevertheless, Deputy Hawkins said that he

was going to pat her down for weapons, to which she said "no."
then told her that

u

He

it wasn't going to be that thorough of a

search."
Taking the totality of the circumstances into consideration,
a reasonable person in Ms. Hughes' position would not feel free to
just walk away by abandoning her property, let alone approaching
Deputy Butcher to take back her property and leave.

Rather,

Deputy Butcher's accusatory tone of voice and language, retention
of

property,11

pat

down,

and

custody

of

her

male

companion

sufficiently restrained Mr. Hughes' freedom to the point that she
was seized Eor purposes of the Fourth Amendment.
D«

Lack of Reasonable Suspicion,

"x [A] level two stop . . . must be supported by reasonable
suspicion

[or it] violates the Fourth Amendment to the United

States Constitution.'"12

Salt

Lake

City

v.

Ray,

2005 UT App 55,

u

See Salt
Lake City v. Ray, 2005 UT App 55, fl4, 998 P.2d 274
(discussing how the retention of personal items coupled with other
factors create a show of official authority such that a reasonable
person would not believe he or she was free to leave).
l2,,

When challenged, the [S]tate has the burden of proving the
reasonableness of the officer's actions during an investigative
detention." State
v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, ^23, 164 P.3d 397 (citing
Florida
v. Foyer,
460 U.S. 491, 497-500 (1983); United
States
v.
Carhee,
27 F.3d 1493, 1496 & n.2 (10th Cir. 1994)).
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1||H, yiJb t\ d v:n

• - f 11- -1 nig <Jf:,}N-> v. Bean,

Ct.

see

App. 19 94));

also

869 P.2d 984, 988 (Utah

Utah Code Ann. § 77-7 15

officer may stop any per soi i :i i i a pi ib] i c pi ace

("A

peace

w h e n he h a s a

reasonable suspicion to believe he h a s committed o r is in the act
of committing o r is attemptii ig to « z DI i in u t: a pi ib 1 ic offense and m a y
demand, h i s n a m e , address and a n e x p l a n a t i o n of h i s actions.") .
A l t h o u g h this standard is lower thai i tl le stai idar d reqi ii red for
probable

cause

circumstances

to

arrest,

approach

the same

is u t i l i z e d

totality

of

to detennin^

facts

and

il Uiere

ire

sufficient "specific and articulable facts" to support reasonable
suspicion.

Ray,

2005 U T A p p 55 at ^18 (citations o m i t t e d ) .

detei m I lii if i whethei

i hi i o b j e c t i v e

standard

h a s b e e n m e t , the

focus n e c e s s a r i l y centers upon the facts k n o w n
immediately

before

I In

/il.-p "'

id.

" " Ii i

to the officer

(quoting State

v

Friesen,

1999 UT A p p 2 6 2 , 1|l2f 988 P.2d 7 ) .
. ;. I i qht of tl le facts J :i IOWI I to Depi iti es B u t c h e r a n d Hawkins
at the time of t h e s e i z u r e , there w a s n o r e a s o n a b l e
s u s p i c i o n supporting the sei/.me of Ms

HI M I H - S

.

articulable

T h e facts known

to the Deputies w e r e , at the very least, as consistent with lawful
behavior

as w i t h

the coi i imissioi I of a cr j rue

t e s t i m o n y of b o t h the D e p u t i e s confirms as m u c h .
exists

no basis upon which

In fact, the
H e n c e , there

to just i l / t he [(>y< ] tw<
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* " and

seizure of Ms. Hughes, which violated her rights under the Fourth
Amendment.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Ms. Hughes respectfully requests that
this Court reverse the trial court's denial of her Motion to
Suppress and remand the case for further proceedings consistent
with this Court's determination.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2 8th day of April, 2007
& WIGGINS, P.C.

fys f OT^-Appellant
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CERTI EI CAXE_QE SEEYICE
I, SCOTT L WIGGINS, hereby certify that I personally caused
to be mailed by First-Class Mail, postage prepaid, two (2) true
and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to the
following on this /L
day of May, 2008:
Mr. J, Frederic Voros, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 SoutX, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Ut 84114-0854
Counsel
for^TR^^Szkte
of Utah
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF D W I S ^TAT!' oi- n-r AH

l

9
cr

, ,|

\ , (>i\l 11<()| I M> si IBS I '\N< T

( S ^ i \\

*/-

degree felony, as .follows: . I hat at the time and place aforesaid the
\ anil lilhiiitiHiiallh

possrs"

i in

i

inliullnl

Jibstanu'

ID wit,

methamphetamine.
COUf
POSSESSION OR USE i)l A t OiN TROLLED SUBSTANCE, (2192) 58-378(2)(d) I JCA, class B misdemeanor, as follows: That at the time and place aforesaid the
defendant, did knowingly and intentionally possess ox use less than one ounce of marijuana, a
Schedule I controlled substance.
This Information is based on evidence obtained from witness Arnold Butcher.

PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT:

The undersigned prosecutor is a Deputy

in

Davis County Attorney and has received information from the investigating officer, Arnold

*

Butcher of the Davis County Sheriffs Office, and the information herein is based upon such

!j5

personal observations and investigation of said officer.

S»

1. On April 9, 2006 officers made contact with defendant and discovered that
she was in possession of controlled substance. Defendant was taken into custody and transported
to the Davis County Jail.
2. During the booking process, methamphetamine was found on her person.
Authorized April 10, 2006
for presentment and filing:
MELVIN C. WILSON
Davis County Attorney

TabB

DEE W.SMITH #8688 of
Attorney for Defendant
2550 Washington Boulevard
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone *So< ? 'I
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IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STA'I I• Ol• 1:1 AH

;i vn ui inAII,

MOTION TO

)

Plaintiff,

)

vs.

)

^RIDGF^ MARIE HUGHES,

)

ase No 061700535
idge Dawson

Defendant.

H':dur'

\ 1 - — Mnj>hp<. thrmmh her attorne."\

Ol

record, Dee W. Smith, and moves this < OUM U> M*ppu ^ u^ * wdence Deing use ; auiiu
>uon is based on the Fnurt'- *ti.i fourteenth ^mendmenls t. *iu
United States-Constitution and Article I, Sections

-

*

• -r

'ni1 "\ supported b\ theaccompanvjnr- 'Memorandum.
DATED this

4

\^>

'

da.

*..

:»»• <S
r

P F F W SMITH
.. ....... r,M n , - .

:

Motion to .Suppress

061 700535

CD19138859
HUGHES,BRIDGET MAR4E

t.

"

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion to Suppress
^ 7
day of July 2006 to
Davis County Attorney's Office
800 W State
P O Box 618
Farmington, UT 84025

l^gaLSeGfetary

DEE W. SMITH #8688 of
Attorney for Defendant
2550 Washington Boulevard
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: (801) 39 l M i w i

/

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
II 1 Al \U l-'OK DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT O*
MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS AND TO
DISMISS

Plaintiff
vs
BRIDGET MARIE HUGHES,
I

Deli miin Id nit

Case No. 061700535
Judge Dawson

COMES NOW, the Defendant above-named in -;ui

.~: H * . L

Smith and hei eby submits the following Memoiandum in Suppou _ -H • Motion >
Suppress.
FACTS
On A,pril 9, 2006, the Defendant and tw

u;

intersection of Avalon and Merlyn Drives in Layton, Utah, ai appioximah:- ? <*• *

*

Sgt.

hm Iici ol in it I )a v ni i * i null i >ln nil i 11 In i
observed these three individuals. He was approximately 500 to 700 feet away from. them.
Sgt. Bucher doesn I uxall illlinr

IIKIIIJ

Mlu'dlu'lil

IIII

mi llic nidi iilnnls

111• uir liiivelirig

towards them. When he was approximately 200 to 500 feet away he lestified that he saw
something "hand IO hand "" Sj;l Itiu.hn

jniliiinnnl I , Ii.ii , d Howards tIM™ individuals. When

he reached them they were near the west side of the road.
Memorandum in Support of Motions to Suppress and <

061700535

CD19138860
HUGHES,BRIDGET MARIE

Sergeant Bucher pulled over and had all three individuals come and talk to him
They began walking away and he had them come back to where he was and talk to him He
thought they looked young so checked to see if there was a curfew violation The Defendant
is 26 and the two males were 22 and 24. He asked them what they were doing and they said
they were just walking home
identification

He asked for identification and none of them had

He obtained the Defendant's personal information and eventually ran a

warrants check
Before the warrants check was done another deputy arrived on the scene He spoke
with the Defendant This deputy asked the Defendant if she had any weapons She pointed
to a small bat that Sgt Bucher had already found She was asked by the deputy if he could
search her pockets She told him no because he wasn't a female. The deputy told her it
wouldn't be a thorough search and that it would be more of a "pat down " She said okay
The deputy then put his hands inside her coat pockets and began searching
gloves, keys, money and cigarettes in the two lower pockets

He found

As he was about to begin

searching the upper left pocket the Defendant told him that there was some marijuana in
there
The deputy removed the marijuana and placed the Defendant under arrest While the
Defendant was being searched at the jail a baggie that contained methamphetamine fell out
of her sock

Defendant has been charged with possession of a controlled substance, a third

degree felony, and possession of a controlled substance, a class B misdemeanor
ARGUMENT
I

THE OFFICER DIDN'T HAVE REASONABLE ARTICULABLE
SUSPICION TO DETAIN THE DEFENDANT

Memorandum in Support
State v Hughes
Case No 061700535
Page 2 of 8

The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution u ..u i "ni^d States, as well a* A;:. : 1
Section 1 1 of the Constitution of the State of I Jtah nrmide in tHevant part: ""The imht ot *:•
people to be secure in tl leii: pet soi is. houses,, papei s ai id effects agaii ist •.. - :M ;•.*.• ;e
searches and seizures shall not be violated,,,," Hie Courts on both the state and federal level
1 lave define d ? I i,c: i i a seizi n e-is i n u ea soi table.
In State v. Hansen, 63 P.3d 650, 661 (Utah, 2002), the Utah Supreme Court, defined
ixiissible levels of seizures. In Hansen, the Court defined
these levels as follows:
A level-one citizen encounter with a law enforcement official is a consensual
encounter wherein a citizen voluntarily responds to non-coercive questioning
by an officer. Since the encounter is consensual, and the person is free to
leave, at any point there is no seizi ire within, the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment
A level-two encounter involves' an investigative iicu
characterized as brief and non-intrusive. Although it is a • own.. ,.*....
seizure, probable cause is not i equircd Rather, when ^ specific and articulable
facts and rational inferences . . . give rise to a reasonable suspicion a person
has or is committing a crime," *>•• <*nv^r may initiate an investigative
detention without consent
A level-three encounter involves an arrest, which has been ''charactenzeu [as
a] highly intrusive or lengthy detention [that] requires probable cause." A
level three encounter is also a Fourth Amendment seizure.

'I he encountei between Detendant and Sgt. Butcher was a level two stop that was not
i!.ir: -f « '!• ountei wneie a
citizen

,\\ •• >i ' t

-\\m\ - «n;|imu'» f

M,

i

-o -< HMVI a\ an\ tune" Stiff- v

Jackson, 805 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). In contrast, a level, two stop occurs ^ hen
a reasonable person., in v ievv of all the circumstances, woi ild believe he or she is w\\ \\
Memorandum in Support...
State v. Hughes
Case No. 0617005 35
Page 3 of 8

to

leave " Id

It is a level two stop "even if the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting

detention brief" State v. Steward, 806 P 2d 213, 215 (UtahCt App 1991)
A "totality of the circumstances" test should be employed to determine if a stop is a
level two stop "There is no bright line test for determining if reasonable suspicion exists
Rather, courts must look at the totality of the circumstances " State v. Potter, 863 P 2d 40, 43
(Utah Ct App. 1993) An officer "must be able to point to specific facts which, considered
with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion " State v. Chism,
107P 3d706, 710(UtahCt App 2005)
Under the totality of the circumstances, the encounter between Defendant and the
officer was a level two stop. Sgt. Butcher ordered the Defendant and her companions to
where he was He asked for identification

He questioned them about weapons and asked

for permission to search A second officer arrived on the scene who further questioned and
searched the Defendant Under these circumstances a reasonable person would not feel free
to disregard the officers instructions and walk away
Since Sgt Butcher conducted a level two stop, he needed "specific, articulable facts
which, together with rational inferences drawn from those facts, would lead a reasonable
person to conclude [Defendant] had committed or was about to commit a crime " State v.
Trujillo, 739 P 2d 85, 88 (Utah Ct App 1987)
In determining whether an officer has reasonable suspicion, courts should "look to
the totality of the circumstances

to determine if there was an objective basis for

suspecting criminal activity" State v. Humphrey, 937 P 2d 137, 141 (Utah Ct App 1997)
When considering the totality of the circumstances the officer's conduct should be judged
"in light of common sense and ordinary human experience
Memorandum m Support
State v Hughes
Case No 061/00535
Page 4 of 8

and we accord deference to

an officer's ability to distinguish between innocent and suspicious actions " United States v.
Williams, 271 F 3d 1262, 1268 (10th Cir 2001)
Reasonable suspicion must also be judged against an objective standard This Court
must consider "whether there were specific and articulable facts known to the officer, which
taken together with rational inferences from these facts, created a reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity to justify intrusion into the defendant's personal security " State v. Fnesen,
988 P 2d 7, 10 (Utah Ct App 1999)
Defendant was outside late at night/early in the morning with two friends crossing
through an intersection together when the officer spotted them from a distance of 500 to 700
feet away The individuals continued to travel together across the intersection, When the
officer was 200 to 300 feet away he allegedly saw a "hand to hand" encounter between two
of the three individuals
This allegedly occurred between three people who were walking together through a
dark intersection

Furthermore it was observed from a distance of at least 200 feet away

This wasn't a situation where two people approached from opposite directions, made a brief
hand-to-hand exchange and then walked away Nonetheless, the officer detained all three
individuals His stated reason was that he wanted to check for a possible curfew violation
However, the Defendant was twenty-six years old at the time and her companions were
twenty-two and twenty-four

None of these facts give rise to a reasonable suspicion that

Defendant was engaged in criminal activity

"In determining whether this objective

standard has been met, the focus necessarily centers upon the facts known to the officer
immediately before the stop " State v. Friesen, 988 P 2d at 10

Memorandum m Support
State v Hughes
Case No 061700535
Page 5 of 8

Citizens enjoy the fundamental right to be free from unreasonable police intrusion
into their lives In Florida v. Royer, 460 U S 491 (1983), the Supreme Court re-affirmed
this principle.
[L]aw enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment by merely
approaching an individual on the street or in another public place, by asking
him if he is willing to answer some questions, by putting questions to him if
he is willing to listen, or by offering in evidence in a criminal prosecution
his voluntary answers to such questions
. The person approached,
however, need not answer any question put to him, indeed he may decline to
listen to the questions at all and may go on his way He may not be detained
even momentarily without reasonable, objective grounds for doing so, and
his refusal to listen or answer does not, without more, furnish those grounds.
Id at 497-98 (Citations and quotations omitted)

The Defendant attempted to exercise her

Constitutional right to be free from an unwanted police intrusion into her life. She was
denied this when she was ordered over to the police vehicle, questioned, ID.'d, frisked, and
searched
There are two cases from the Utah Court of Appeals where the Court found that
observing a hand-to-hand exchange gave the officer reasonable suspicion to detain an
individual However, both cases are easily distinguishable from the facts in the case at bar
The first was State v. Beach, 47 P.3d 932 (Utah Ct App 2002) In Beach, officers were in
an area known for high drug activity
known drug house

They were watching a specific area that was near a

While the officers were observing this known drug area, an officer

observed occupants of a vehicle, which didn't have a license plate and was parked in a
manner that obstructed traffic, make a hand-to-hand exchange with a pedestrian Id. at 935
In State v. Singleton, 128 P 3d 28 (Utah Ct App 2005), an officer was driving
through a trailer park that was known to law enforcement as a drug trafficking area

While

the officer was driving through the trailer park he observed two people conduct a hand-toMemorandum in Support
State v Hughes
Case No 061700535
Page 6 of 8

hand transaction as they stood near a parked vehicle

The officer pulled his patrol vehicle

behind the parked car in a manner to not block the vehicle's exit

As he did this, one of the

individuals walked to the passenger side of the vehicle while the defendant turned and
walked toward the trailer court. The officer detained the individuals and eventually a warrant
and controlled substances were discovered The Court of Appeals found that an observation
of a hand-to-hand exchange in an area known for drug trafficking formed a basis for
reasonable suspicion Id at 30-31
The facts in the case at bar are distinguishable from the facts in the cases cited supra
There was no evidence that the Defendant was in a high drug or crime area Furthermore, the
facts the officer observed were not consistent with a drug deal The three individuals were
together crossing a street The fact that the observation of the "hand to hand" was observed
on a dark street from a distance of at least two hundred feet is contrary to finding that a
reasonable person would conclude Defendant had committed or was about to commit a
crime For these reasons, Defendant respectfully requests this Court to suppress all evidence
that was found following the detention of the Defendant

CONCLUSION
The officer did not have reasonable suspicion that Defendant was engaged in
criminal activity that would justify stopping her For these reasons, the Defendant requests
that this Court suppress all evidence that followed this unlawful stop
DATED this ^

day of July 2006

DEEW SMITH
Attorney for Defendant

Memorandum in Support
State v Hughes
Case No 061700535
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum m
Support to
Davis County Attorney
800 West State Street
P O Box 618
Farmington, Utah 84025
postage prepaid this

Memorandum in Support
State v Hughes
Case No 061700535
Page 8 of 8

day of July 2006
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,
vs.

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION
TO SUPPRESS

BRIDGET MARIE HUGHES
Defendant.

Case No. 061700535
Judge: Glen R. Dawson

The State of Utah, by and through William K. McGuire, Deputy Davis County
Attorney, hereby submits the following Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to
Suppress.
I. STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. On April, 10,2006 at 1:00 a.m., the Defendant was observed along with two other
males by Sgt. Butcher of the Davis County Sheriffs Office. Officer Butcher recognized the time
and was going to check for curfew violation because the individuals appeared to be under age.
2. Officer Butcher, while driving through the intersection of Avalon and Merlyn Drive in
Layton, observed the Defendant and the other two males make what appeared to be a hand-tohand exchange.
3. The Defendant and two males, in the intersection of Avalon and Merlyn Drive, then
noticed Officer Butcher and started to walk away in a very quick manner.
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to I

061700535
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HUGHES,BRIDGET MARIE

4. Officer Butcher then stopped his patrol car and asked the Defendant and two males
what they were doing. Their reply was that they were "doing nothing" and that they were
"walking home."
5. Officer Butcher asked for identification and none of them had identification. Officer
Butcher then asked for permission to do a pat down search for weapons and all the individuals
consented to being searched.
6. Deputy Hawkins arrived on the scene and assisted Officer Butcher with the consensual
search. Deputy Hawkins obtained further consent from the Defendant to search her.
7. Deputy Hawkins came to an inside pocket, whereupon, the Defendant stated that there
"might be marijuana in there." Deputy Hawkins then removed a plastic bag with marijuana in it
from the pocket of the Defendant. A cigarette carton was found on the Defendant which
contained a small butt of a marijuana joint.
8. Deputy Easton, a female officer, was requested to do a more thorough search of the
Defendant. Deputy Easton arrived and further searched the Defendant telling her to disclose any
other illegal substances before going to jail because if substances were taken into the jail the
Defendant could be charged with a felony. Further searching revealed nothing.
9. Defendant was transported to jail and searched by Sgt. Cruzy. During the booking
process a small plastic bag fell from the Defendant's sock. Defendant attempted to conceal the
item denying that there was anything under her foot.
10. Sgt. Cruzy obtained the bag and noticed a white crystal like substance which
contained methamphetamine.
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II. ARGUMENT
I.

OFFICER BUTHCER WAS JUSTIFIED IN HIS ASKING FOR DEFENDANT'S
IDENTIFICATION.
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that officers need not have reasonable

suspicion or probable cause to ask an individual for identification. "Even when officers have no
basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may generally ask questions of that individual;
ask to examine the individual's identification; and request consent to search." Muehler v. Mena,
544 U.S. 93, 125 S.Ct. 1465, 161 L.Ed.2d 299 92005) (citing Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429,
H I S . Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389). Utah courts have taken a similar approach to requests for
identification. See, e.g., State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 618 (1987) (asking a defendant for
identification and explanation of their presence falls within the first level of detention); State v.
Jackson, 805 P. 2d 765, 768 (1990), ("as a matter of law, a request for identification cannot
constitute a show of authority sufficient to convert an innocent encounter into a seizure.").
Applying the case law to the facts of this case, it is clear that Officer Butcher's stop is
consistent with the courts own definition of a level-one stop. Here Officer Butcher noticed what
appeared to be three young individuals out past curfew conducting a hand-to-hand exchange.
Officer Butcher approached them to confirm or deny his suspicion. Upon his approach the
individuals noticed him and began to walk away. After stopping them he asked for names,
identification and age. He also asked for their consent to search them. Neither defendant nor tire
other two could provide Officer Butcher with identification. However, they all consented to be
searched. In Florida v.Bostick the Court stated that examining one's identification and receiving
consent to search one's luggage does not violate the Fourth Amendment or constitute a seizure.
3

Officer Butcher asked for defendant's identification, age and received consent to search her for
any weapons. Further, Office Butcher noticed what appeared to be three young individuals out
past curfew. His approach and request for identification falls under a level-one stop even by
Utah courts standards. State v. Detiman, 739 P.2d 616 (1987).
II.

OFFICER BUTCHER HAD REASONABLE ARTICULATE SUSPICION TO
DETAIN THE DEFENDANT.
Even if for the sake of argument that Officer Butcher's stop was not a level-one stop, Officer

Butcher had reasonable articulable suspicion to detain defendant. "In determining whether . . .
officers had a reasonable articulable suspicion to justify Defendant's temporary detention, we 'look
to the totality of the circumstances . . . to determine if there was an objective basis for suspecting
criminal activity.'" State v. Beach, 47 P.3d 932, 935 (Utah Ct. App. 2002) (citation omitted)
(emphasis added). "In considering the totality of the circumstances, we 'judge the officer's conduct
in light of common sense and ordinary human experience... and we accord deference to an officer's
ability to distinguish between innocent and suspicious actions." Id (citation omitted); State v.
Singleton, 128 P.3d 28, 29 (Utah Ct. App. 2005). Further, officer's may "draw on their own
experience and specialized training to make inferences from deductions about the cumulative
information available to them that might well elude an untrained person." Singleton, at 29-30 (citing
United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002)). Finally, to establish reasonable suspicion,
officers need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct, because the likelihood of criminal
activity needed to establish reasonable suspicion falls considerably short of the standard known as a
preponderance of the evidence. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266,273-77 (2002); Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S.
119, 125(2000).
Although the determination of reasonable articulable suspicion is a fact sensitive
4

determination, Utah courts have found that it existed in cases extremely similar to the case at hand.
First, Utah courts recognize that "nervous, evasive behavior is an important fact in determining
reasonable suspicion" in cases of suspected drug possession or distribution. Singleton, at 30 (citing
Wardlow, at 124-25). Likewise, Utah courts recognize that reasonable suspicion exists where
individuals in a deserted shopping area turned their backs to police when officers drove by. IcL
(citing U.S. v. Bull 565 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1977)). Further, courts recognized that a "hand-to-hand
exchange between individuals in an area known for drug traffic [is] sufficient to constitute
reasonable suspicion." IcL
Applying the case law to the facts in this case, it is clear that reasonable articulable suspicion
existed in this matter. First, Officer Butcher observed three individuals, including the defendant,
standing in the intersection of Avalon and Merlyn Drive. Not only did Officer Butcher notice three
individuals in the middle of an intersection it was very early in the morning at 1:00 a.m. Further,
Officer Butcher noticed what appeared to be a hand-to-hand contact between the individuals. After
this initial hand-to-hand contact the defendant and the other two individuals then noticed the officer
and began to walk away from him in a very quick manner. The facts of this case are similar to the
recent Utah Court of Appeals case, State v. Singleton, 128 P.3d 28 (Utah App. 2005). In Singleton,
an officer drove through a trailer park just before midnight and observed two individuals conduct a
hand-to-hand transaction near a parked vehicle. The officer concluded that based on his training and
experience, he had witnessed behavior consistent with an exchange of money for drugs. When the
officer approached the individuals, they both began to walk away. The court declared that
"unprovoked flight is the exact opposite of going about one's business." Singleton, at 30 (citing
Wardlow at 119-120). The Court went on to state that "headlong flight ••• is the consummate act of

5

evasion." Id at 124. The court, using the totality of the circumstances standard, found that the handto-hand exchange, the history of the area, and the evasive behavior of the defendants, was sufficient
to provide the officer with reasonable articulable suspicion to detain the defendants. See id at 29-31.
While the intersection of Avalon and Merlyn Drive is not considered to be a high drug trafficking
area, the lateness of the hour, the officer's own training and experience and the evasive behavior of
the defendant make the situation extremely suspicious. If hand-to-hand contact between two
unknown individuals occurring in a high drug trafficking area is grounds for reasonable articulable
suspicion, then hand-to-hand contact at a very late hour, in the middle of an intersection, coupled
with the evasive behavior of the defendant and the officer's own training and experience is grounds
for reasonable articulable suspicion. Thus, Officer Butcher had reasonable suspicion to stop
defendant.

in. CONCLUSION
Based on the forgoing, the State respectfully requests that the Court deny defendant's
Motion to Suppress.

DATED August 7, 2006.

/pe

^jx^yfy^t

William K. McGuire
Deputy Davis County Attorney
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/DELIVERY
I certify that I mailed/delivered a copy of the foregoing Memorandum in Opposition
to Defendant's Motion to Suppress to Dee Smith, Attorney for Defendant, 2550 Washington Blvd.,
Ogden, UT 84401 on August 7, 2006.
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3

For the Plaintiff:

STEVEN V. MAJOR

4

For the Defendant:

DEE W. SMITH

5

P R O C E E D I N G S

6

THE COURT:

Okay, counsel, will you direct me?

7

MR. SMITH:

Your Honor, the only other matters I'm

8

aware of that I have are 7 4 and 75, Bridget Hughes.

9

THE COURT: Do you folks want to make argument on

10

those?

I have had a chance to - I've reviewed the tape, I've

11

reviewed your briefings, I've read a number of cases and I'm

12

ready to make a decision but if you want more argument.

13

MR. SMITH:

I would reiterate what I briefed.

14

the Court has read the briefs —

15

THE COURT:

I did.

If

I read them and I had our law

16

clerk read them and Jessica and why don't we call those.

17

It's State of Utah vs. Bridget Marie Hughes, 031700171,

18

061700535.

19

argument.

20

again including watching the tape of the testimony.

21

that the important facts here include the fact that there

22

were three individuals, appeared young, were out at

23

approximately 1:00 in the morning, potentially in violation

24

of 11:00 p.m. curfew.

25

Apparently they started to walk away but he pulled over to

The later is the one that's set for oral
It's the new charge and I have reviewed everything
I note

The officer approached them.
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1

identification alone as a matter of law does not constitute a

2

show of authority sufficient to convert an innocent encounter

3

into a seizure.

4

The search was consistent - was pursuant to consent and I

5

must deny the motion.

In my view, this never got beyond level 1.

6

Where would you like to go with this?

7

MR. SMITH:

Your Honor, I believe she'd like to set

THE COURT:

You bet.

8

a trial.

9
10

I'd be glad to do that.

So

will it be a one-day jury trial?

11

MR. SMITH:

I think one day should be sufficient.

12

THE COURT:

Let me grab my calendar, counsel.

13

Let' s set the matter November 9th.

14

(Discussion of dates and other trials pending)

15

THE COURT: I have an opportunity of December 6th -

16

or December 7th actually.

17

any further into December.

18

don't think they like it on either side.

19

think it gives them more reason to acquit or more reason to

20

convict.

Frankly, I probably wouldn't go
Juries just don't like it.
I mean I don't

I just don't think they like it.

21

MR. SMITH:

December 7th would be fine.

22

THE COURT:

Do you want to shoot for that?

23

MR. MAJOR:

That would be fine.

24

THE COURT:

All right.

25

I

Do you think I better do a

waiver of a speedy trial?
59

MR. MAJOR:

I think we're within the time frame.

MR. SMITH; Yes, she'-s not i n custody.
TI IE COURT:

M s . Hug! les is i lot in custody and has

been v e r y good about attending each time after the baby w a s

J r: Bountj.ru i, »0b South Main S t r e e t , Courtroom \l
is Case N o . 0 6 1 7 0 0 5 3 5 , 1-day jury t r i a l .

I m e a n t 8:30,

sorry.
w ill "M be you,

THE C O U R T :

?

Mia j or?

A n d M r , Smith, M s . Hughes is out on

b o n d so that/s still i n p l a c e ? " T h e b o n d is still in p l a c e ,
Ms

Hughes?
MS. HUGHE;-;: Y e s .
1

requested

i-

• -*

/
:i

urv mst. ructions musi

D O filed and in m y chambers

-ls ;dv-^-^-

J- Ho'iiU. Ti., one we-
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Any

Jdyi; >f

Ai v plea negot iations must be approved by m e

a t t h e f i n a J ' p r e 1: r :i a •] w h :i c h vi :i 1 ] b e ^ • e t N o-v e nib e r 2 8 , ' T i i e s a a y
at 2:30.

So Ms. Hughes, you need

Tuesday at 2:30.

to

be here

November 28,

Again, the ;trial is the 7th.

? n ly o t l l e r < Drder^'fcqi ins e l

y • : I / d ] it ] ;: E I: : 1 lave tl; ICE

Court set in place from the. State?
MR. MAJOR:

No, Your Honor.
60

1

THE COURT:

From the defense?

2

MR. SMITH:

No Your Honor.

3

THE COURT:

All right counsel, we'll see you then,

4 I

(Whereupon the hearing was concluded)
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2nd District - Farmmgton
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATF OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

M1NUIES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENI
NOTICr
ut

vs

H

Judge
D it

BRIDGET MARIE HUGHES,
Defendant.
fusi odv
% n Recognizance

M J /UO
GLEN R DAWSON
M m rh " n 007

PRESENT
Clerklands
Prosecutor- MAJOR, STEVFN V
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s). SMITH, Dll
Agency- Adult Probation & Parole
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: March 22, 1980
Video
Tape

Numl < i

II

0 (ifii

Tape C o u n t :

339

CHARGES

f

ILLEGAL POSS/USE Ob CONTROLLED
Plea- Guilty
Disposition:
POSSESSION OF
1 OZ MARIJUANA
Plea- Guilty
Disposition-

SUBS1ANCE - jid Deyiee I el my
01/18/2007 Guilty
- Class B Misdemeanor
01/18/9007 Oinltv

SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction ot ILLEGAL POSS/USE Of
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is
sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed live years in
the Utah State Prison
The prison term is suspended

061700535

JD19517503
HUGHES.BRIDGET MAI L

Case No: 061700535
Date:
Mar 06, 2007

SENTENCE JAIL
Based on bhe defendant's conviction of POSSESSION OF < 1 OZ
MARIJUANA a Class B Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a
term of 130 day(s) The total time suspended for this charge is 180
day(s).
Defendant is sentenced to serve 30 day(s) of home confinement.
SENTENCE JAIL SERVICE NOTE
The defendant is to serve 3 0 days of home confinement with AP&P
being hooked up by 3-13-07.
SENTENCE FINE
Charge # 3

Fine
Suspended
Surcharge
Due

$9250.00
$9040.00
$110.00
$210.00

Charge # 2

Fine
Suspended
Surcharge

$1850.00
$1850.00
$

Total Fine
Total Suspended
Total Surcharge
Total Principal Due

$11100.00
$10890.00
$110.00
$210.00
Plus Interest
Fine payments are to be made to Adult Probation and Parole Court,
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Case No: 061 7 0 0535
Date:
Mar 0 6, 2 00 7
SENTENCE FINE PAYMENT NOTE
Tl ie fine and fee are to be paid at the rate of $50.00 per month
beginning 04-15-07.
COMMI JNITY SERVICE
Complete 150 hour(s) of community service.
Community service to be completed through Adult Probation & Parole.
Community service is to be completed by July 33 , 2007.
SENTENCE TRUST
The defendai it in i<» pay the iollowing:
Attorney Fees:
Amount: $500.00 Plus Interest
Pay in behalf of: PUBLIC DEFENDER FEE DAVIS COUNTY TREASURER
The amount of Attorney Fees is to be determined by Adult Probation
& Parole.
ORDER OF PROBATION
The* defendant is placed on probation for 36 month (s)
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole.
Defendant is to pay a fine of 210.00 which includes the surcharge.
Interest may increase the final amount due.
PROBATION CONDITIONS
CONDUCT: Commit no further violations of- the law.
ALCOHOL: Do not use or possess alcoholic beverages or frequent
places where alcohol is the chief item for sale.
DRUGS: Do not use or possess controlled substance ^i. ^-^ ^_
presence of those who i ise, possess or distribute controlled
substances.
4
TESTING: Submit to h:>'i\ : . I-J^ i«- • , . •
> .:--•>
n ug or
alcohol- use.
PROGRAM/TREATMENT: Enter, participate in and complete ah}, program,
counseling or treatment as directed by AP&P.
SEARCH CONSENT: Submit to search of person, premises or vehicle
and seizure of any evidence without a search warrant at the request
of police or probation officer, if they have, reasonable cause.
AP&P CONDITIONS: Complete any other terms or conditions or
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Case No. 061700535
Date
Mar 06, 2007
probation as required by AP&P and sign a probation agreement,
No association with known drug users.
Complete DNA testing and pay the fee
REVIEW OF C/S is scheduled.
Date: 08/02/2007
Time: 02:44 p.m.
Location: Courtroom 3
Justice Complex
800 West State Street
Farmington, UT 84 02 5
Before Judge: GLEN R. DAWSON
Dated this

(X^

day of

T^V^C-

20_67,

^ S U —<
GLEN R. DAWSON
District Court
In compliance with the Americans with Disabilities A6,
needing special accommodations (including auxiliary
aids and services) should call All Holmes at 8 0 1 - 4 $ ^
three working days prior to the proceeding. (For Tf
Utah Relay at 1-800-346-4128 or 711) The general
number is 801-447-3800.
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